The objective of this paper is to identify the role of memory in repeated contracts with moral hazard in …nancial intermediation. We use an original dataset from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to test a basic model with repeated moral hazard. To capture the role of memory, we need to control for the adverse selection e¤ect. We propose a simple empirical method to achieve it. Our results unambiguously isolate the e¤ect of memory on the bank's lending decisions.
Introduction
The optimal long-term contract in repeated moral hazard generally exhibits memory (Lambert 1983 , Rogerson 1985 and Chiappori et al. 1994 ). The decisions made by the agent and the principal in the current period depend on past outcomes. With repeated contracts the principal is able to learn from the agent's past history and, hence, propose a long-term contract that internalizes this information over time. The bene…t is that risk sharing across time is improved. A natural application of longterm contracting is in …nancial intermediation where banks and borrowers tend to maintain durable relationships and moral hazard is a key problem Weiss 1981, 1983) . It has been proved that, thank to memory, a long-term credit contract bene…ts the borrower in the shape of lower interest rates and fewer collateral demands (Boot and Thakor 1994) . Other models, however, predict that the duration of the bank-borrower relationship in fact increases the borrowing cost because its bene…ts also create for the borrower switching costs to start a new relationship with a competitor (Greenbaum et al. 1989 and Sharpe 1990 ). The bene…ts of the reduction in moral hazard through memory would thus be o¤set by the market power gained by the bank. These con ‡icting predictions are reproduced by the empirical literature. Berger and Udell (1995) and Bodenhorn (2003) Krahnen 1998). This inconclusive empirical evidence illustrates that the borrowing cost may not only be a function of duration but also of other factors. It tends to increase with the amount of credit, the riskiness of the project and market power but tends to decrease with competition. In addition, banks use the borrowing cost to sort out borrowers and eliminate the ones with the highest probability of default. It is therefore an instrument that can deal with both adverse selection and moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) . The e¤ect of memory is then di¢ cult to capture.
We argue that the method used so far by the empirical literature is ‡awed. It pools all …rms whatever the duration (or frequency or intensity) of the relationship with their bank, and estimates the e¤ect of duration on the borrowing cost. The problem is that the borrowing cost can vary across …rms not only because of the duration of the relationship but also as a result of the banks'screening policy for adverse selection. In other words, this method is unable to disentangle the e¤ects of adverse selection and moral hazard on the level of borrowing cost, which in turn prevents us from identifying the e¤ect of memory.
The present paper proposes a di¤erent empirical strategy to overcome this problem. First of all, in common with the rest of the literature, we focus on one single bank to control for unobserved heterogeneity in lending policy. We build an original database from data made public by the Londonbased European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) on all its investments in private and public …rms during the …rst years of its life (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . 1 Second, our dataset allows us to split it into two subpopulations: …rms which have signed one single contract and …rms which have signed more than one contract. In so doing, we control for the adverse selection e¤ect. In both subpopulations, the amount of lending and the type of contract set for each …rm's …rst contract re ‡ect the screening policy of the bank. In the subpopulation of the several-contracts …rms information on the …rms'past actions obviously exists. The question is: will the bank use it? We run regressions for each of the two subpopulations. If the same results obtain, this means that the bank does not use the past history of its clients in designing contracts. Our results clearly show that it is not the case. The total project value of the …rst signed contract (and not of the following ones) is neatly identi…ed as the dominant individual …xed e¤ect in the design of contracts for …rms which signed more than one.
This result could, however, be driven by the e¤ect of competition. The bank could indeed o¤er better lending conditions to its long-term clients in order to prevent them from going to competitors. The 1 Any local or foreign …rm is eligible for EBRD …nancing. speci…city of the EBRD enables us to rule out this possibility. The EBRD was created in 1991 just after the Soviet Bloc had collapsed to assist the countries of that region in transforming their centrally-planned economic systems into market economies. When it started its lending operations in 1991, the business environment of all these countries was characterized by large output fall, complete disorganization of production, macroeconomic and political instability and inadequate banking sector. This exceptional situation makes the EBRD experience an interesting natural experiment for two reasons. First, the management of risk had to be carried out in a very uncertain environment. The country risk was high owing to the macroeconomic turmoil and all potential borrowers had no market experience and no history of creditworthiness. Second, its decisions were not a¤ected by competition because local banks were insolvent and foreign banks did not enter these risky markets in the early transition period.
Moreover, the public shareholders of the EBRD appointed to the bank the mission to lead the …nancial ‡ows to these countries and not to crowd out private investments. The EBRD was therefore in a situation of monopoly.
The control for the adverse selection e¤ect and the monopolistic behavior of the EBRD o¤er ideal conditions to test memory in long-term credit contracting. Our estimations yield unambiguous results validating the predictions of contract theory on repeated moral hazard.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the model of the EBRDclient relationship. The data and descriptive statistics are presented in section 3. Section 4 examines the econometric analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 The EBRD-client relationship
The EBRD
With a capital of 20 billion euros and owned by sixty-one countries and two intergovernmental institutions (the European Union and the European Investment Bank), the EBRD is a peculiar investment bank. Its main characteristics are the following:
Unlike private investment banks, the EBRD has sovereign shareholders that do not receive dividends.
Its investments are geographically restricted to the region of the former Soviet Bloc.
Unlike the World Bank, the EBRD invests mainly in private enterprises. According to our calculations, the share of public clients between 1991 and 2003 does not exceed 12:5% of the total share and 23% of cumulated investment.
Its investments have to respect environmental standards.
Its mandate stipulates that it must only work in countries that are committed to democratic principles. Nevertheless, some investments have been realized in certain countries that are far from being fully- ‡edged democracies.
From a theoretical point of view, we consider the objective function of the EBRD as identical to that of any investment bank. Its objective is to maximize pro…ts from investment projects and to do so by using all the instruments available on the …nancial markets to raise funds and protect its portfolio against risks. 2 Figure 1 describes the EBRD performance over time.
Its constraints, however, are di¤erent. It must invest in a restricted geographic area and this precludes diversi…cation of its portfolio with investments in safer places in the rest of the world. Therefore, in this respect, the EBRD faces a harder constraint than any other investment bank. On the other hand, its sovereign shareholders virtually guarantee protection against bankruptcy, which is far from the case for any other private investment bank. This feature together with its stable sovereign ownership allows 2 In fact, the objectives of the EBRD are not totally identical to those of other investment banks. The EBRD aims at being a catalyst for …nancial institutions and wants to avoid crowding them out. In other words, the EBRD does not see other …nancial institutions as competitors. However, in the bank-client relationship, which is our concern in this paper, its objective is to maximize pro…ts from its clients'projects, i.e., in accordance with the EBRD's statement, to apply "sound banking principles". the EBRD to raise funds in the best conditions and, simultaneously, face the high risks inherent in investing in the region.
The theoretical model
Our theoretical model aims at designing an optimal contract signed under moral hazard (as in Lambert (1983) and Chiappori-Macho Stadler (1990) ). First, we consider a one-stage game corresponding to a contract running for one period. The bank and its client agree to sign the contract; then, the bank …nances the …rm which realizes the investment and pays back the loan (plus interest) to the bank. 3 Second, we consider a contract that lasts for two periods. In this two-stage game, the bank grants a loan in two distinct periods. After the signature of the contract by both parties, the bank delivers a part of the loan to the …rm that starts the investment. At the end of the …rst period, the bank observes the results of the …rm's investment and decides under which condition to lend the remaining part of the loan. We therefore assume that the contract signed in the …rst period is binding: the bank has to give the second part of the loan to the …rm but can change the conditions if the …rm does not behave well 3 In this section, for the sake of simplicity, we intend 'loan'to mean any kind of credit contract the bank may propose.
in the …rst period. It is in this second type of contract that the problem of incompleteness arises and the role of memory turns out to be fundamental.
A simple model with moral hazard
The simplest credit model involving a principal-agent relationship is structured as follows: the bank (the principal) lends an amount of money M to the …rm (the agent) and asks for a refund of R if the …rm's investment is successful, a refund of R otherwise (R >R). The …rm uses M to …nance its investment. If the …rm produces the good e¤ort H, the return of the investment is I and it has to pay back R to the bank. If it produces the low e¤ort L, the return of the investment is I and it has to pay back R. The bene…t is assumed to be higher when the …rm produces a high e¤ort: (I R)>(I R)>0.
The greater e¤ort, however, costs V H to the …rm. It is assumed that the application process for a loan costs a strictly positive amount C to the …rm. If the bank turns down the application the …rm incurs the loss C. If the bank accepts the application, it sets the conditions of the loan and the …rm has to agree with them. If the …rm disagrees it has to pay C. 4 The bank is assumed to be risk-neutral and the …rm risk-neutral with a limited liability. The liability condition ensures that the investment return is su¢ cient to cover the capital that the …rm has to pay back plus the initial sunk cost C. The task of the bank is then to choose the right incentive to induce the …rm to provide the maximum e¤ort in order both to make the investment successful and yield the highest return. The investment will be successful with probability P i (for i = H; L) and will fail with probability (1 P i ) (for i = H; L).
In the one-stage contract, the bank faces the following maximization programme:
and I R + C; I R + C;
where (1) is the utility function of the bank, inequality (2) is the participation constraint of the …rm and inequality (3) is the incentive compatibility constraint of the …rm and inequalities (4) are the limited liability conditions of the …rm. Given the bank's utility function, we are interested in de…ning the optimal contract under which the …rm chooses the e¤ort good enough to obtain I. Since the objective function is linear in R, the solution of the problem is given the substitution of the constraint (3) into (2).
For P H > P L we obtain the following equilibrium results :
These are the two solutions for the existence of a separating equilibrium that guarantees the existence of an optimal contract. Such a contract allows the bank to distinguish the two possible behaviors of the …rm and reward them in a di¤erent way in order to motivate the …rm to choose the higher e¤ort.
Nevertheless, the two solutions (5) must satisfy the liability conditions (4) . Since the bank wants to force the …rm to make the maximum e¤ort, as in a standard moral hazard problem (see Macho Stadler and Pérez Castrillo, 2001), the principal (the bank) has to incur a cost which implies reducing its pro…ts in comparison with a situation without moral hazard. In order to make the …rm behave well, the bank o¤ers the following contract which turns out to be Pareto optimal :
If the investment fails the bank extracts all the surplus of the …rm. If it is successful the …rm receives a premium reducing the pro…ts of the bank. This threat is credible since the …rm has an incentive to provide the higher e¤ort.
A two-period model with moral hazard: the role of the memory
In the previous section the amount of the loan, once accepted by the bank, was delivered to the …rm all at once. In this section we assume that it is paid in two steps. The problem faced by the bank therefore becomes dynamic. At the beginning of the …rst period, the bank determines the total amount of the loan and delivers the …rst part to the …rm. In the second period, it always delivers the second part but can change the conditions under which the loan must be paid back. In a two-period loan, two scenarios are possible depending on whether the two stages are independent or not. If the stages are independent, the …nal result is the sum of the results of two one-stage games. Such a contract is nevertheless an incomplete one. Chiappori et al. (1994) prove that the long-term relationship can outperform a succession of day-by-day agreements if the role of memory is taken into account. To obtain this result, the principal's objective function must be time-separable and the current behavior must a¤ect the probability of the current outcome. Under these assumptions the bank can write a long-term renegotiation-proof contract by adapting the terms of the contract in the second period with respect to the return of the …rm's investment in the …rst period. The bank, therefore, remembers the return of the …rm's …rst-period investment. The structure of such a contract is optimal: neither the principal (bank) nor the agent (the …rm) has an incentive to deviate and sign a new contract.
In order to formalize memory in our setting, it is assumed that the utility function of the bank is time-separable and the pro…ts of the second period are related to the outcome of the …rst one. 5 The …rm has to pay back R 2 if the investment is successful in both periods, R 2 if it is a failure in both periods, R 0 2 if it is a success in the …rst period, but a failure in the second one, and R 0 2 if it is a failure in the …rst period and a success in the second one. We de…ne four returns of the investment for the …rm in the second period as I 2 (for success in both periods), I 2 (for failure in both periods), I 0 2 (for failure in the …rst period and success in the second one), and I 0 2 (for success in the …rst period and failure in the second one). We also assume that the bank commits itself to giving the same amount of money to the …rm in case of both failure and success in the …rst period. As before, we impose limited liability (condition 12). All the constraints take the role of memory into account. In the second period …rms do not have to pay the cost C as in the …rst period but the bank has to build a device to force the …rm to behave well in both periods. This device is represented by a premium which is a debt reduction in period two if the …rm behaves well in period one or a debt increase otherwise. Finally, it is assumed that, for a given level of e¤ort, the probability of failure or success of an investment is the same in both periods.
Given all the previous assumptions the problem is de…ned as follows:
and
where (??) is the utility function of the bank when there are two periods. The number of the constraints increases with the number of the additional variables we introduce. Inequalities (8), (9), (10), and (11) are respectively the new participation and the incentive compatibility constraints. As mentioned earlier, conditions (12) are the limited liability constraints. The objective function of the bank is linear in the variables R 2 ; R 2 ; R 0 2 ; R 0 2 and the constraints are linearly independent. We solve the problem as before with respect to the corresponding constraints and we obtain for P H > P L :
By comparing these results with the liability constraints we obtain four di¤erent optimal values of the amount of money the …rm has to pay back to the bank which correspond to four di¤erent situations.
Hence, the optimal equilibrium values for the renegotiation-proof contracts are :
The optimal strategy of the bank in the second period is to propose four di¤erent contracts to the …rm according to the results obtained in the …rst period. These contracts are Pareto optimal contracts since no agent has an incentive to deviate from the given strategy. Hence, this set of solutions are four renegotiation-proof contracts, and no pro…table deviating behavior is allowed. These four di¤erent contracts, therefore, describe the optimal strategy of the bank in face of any risk situation.
Data and descriptive statistics
We have built an original database from data made public by the EBRD over time. Our database includes 1788 …nancial contracts signed by the bank with private and public clients from 1991 to 2003.
It contains information on the identity of the clients, the amount of the contract in ECU/Euros, the value of the investment project, the sector of investment, the nationality of the client, the year the contract was signed, the type of contract (loan, share, equity and guarantee), and other characteristics (old clients, private/public, macro-programmes...). In this section we present a brief overview of the content of our database and we discuss the most relevant descriptive statistics.
The contracts
The number of contracts and the amount of the annual investments were very low at the beginning of the transition process (see Figures 2 and 3 ). The EBRD was underusing its capital, a source of criticism among the shareholders and commentators. This underuse was principally because of the severe macroeconomic downturn that a¤ected the entire region. After these initial di¢ culties, the bank's target was to strongly increase the volume of the portfolio. The recovery of most of the countries in the region helped the EBRD to sign more contracts and make sizeable pro…ts from 1999 onwards. The average EBRD investment has been remarkably stable with a slight downward trend in the most recent years (see Figure 4 ). According to the information available on the EBRD website, the bank designed di¤erent kinds of contracts. They all represent the …nancial instruments by which the bank participates in the realization of the investment project proposed by the borrower. These contracts not only di¤er in the maturity of the credits but also in other characteristics that we will discuss below.
First, in Table 1 , we provide a general overview of the di¤erent kinds of contracts signed by the bank and their frequency:
[ Table 1 about here]
Three main categories of credit instruments can be distinguished: loan, guarantee, and share and equity contracts. Loans have been the …nancial contract most frequently used by the EBRD between 1991 and 2003 ( Figure 5 ). A loan is generally considered as a short-term contract, lasting …ve years on average, and tailored to meet the particular requirements of the project. The credit risk is usually taken by the bank or partially syndicated to the market. A loan may be securitized by a borrower's asset and/or converted into shares or be equity-linked. The second important category of contracts includes share and equity. Share-type contracts were mainly signed at the beginning of the EBRD's activity while equity contracts represent a broader category of …nancial contracts including share contracts. An equity investment can be undertaken in various forms, including subscription to ordinary shares. When the EBRD takes an equity stake it expects an appropriate return on its investment. The bank usually sells its equity investment on a non-recourse base, has a clear exit strategy and only takes a minority position. 6 The third category of credit instruments refers to guarantee contracts. They have been used mainly at the end of our dataset period. By this type of contract, the bank helps borrowers in gaining access to …nancial sources through the provision of guarantees (EBRD, 1999 Table 2 and 3 show descriptive statistics on the total values of projects that have been selected by the EBRD and the share that it e¤ectively …nanced. In most accepted projects, the EBRD is not the only lending source. The statistical information is given for the total population and two parts of it, one at the outset of transition (1993) (1994) (1995) and the other at the end of the period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . The total project value of loans is always higher than that of shares, but both have decreased over time. The median bank lending in loan contracts has remained unchanged over time while it has declined in share contracts. Figure 6 compares the fraction of the total project value …nanced by the EBRD for share and loan contracts. This fraction increases proportionally with the total project value but the increase is more pronounced for shares than for loans. As a shareholder the bank can control the management of the …rm which implies the reduction of uncertainty associated with the imperfect information about 6 Equity is considered to be a non-contingent contract. the …rm's behavior. The bank tends to augment its participation with the size of the project value in share contracts in order to protect itself against the risk. As for loans, the collateral allows for a control of risk.
[ Table 2 about here]
[ Table 3 about here]
We also split the population into two subgroups of …rms: 7 a …rst group with …rms which have obtained one credit over the sample period (around 1270 …rms) and a second group of those which have signed more than one contract (around 100 …rms). Tables 4 and 5 show data for single-contract and several-contract …rms respectively. The median bank lending fraction for several-contract …rms is always more important than for single-contract …rms. These di¤erences may be associated with reputation premia.
[ Table 4 about here]
[ Table 5 about here]
Countries and sectors
There are two criteria that can account for the geographical distribution of contracts between 1991 and 2003: market size (population size or income per-capita), and political regime. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the geographical distribution of the EBRD investments in cumulated terms by country and per-capita by country. Russia has received more credits than any other country in the region over the period followed by the Eastern European countries, and then by the Central Asian countries.
The latter countries not only have a poor business climate but also non-democratic institutions. In terms of the cumulated amount of investments per capita, the ranking among the host countries is 7 This split of the population will be essential to test the role of memory on bank behavior in the econometric exercise. [ Table 6 about here]
We split the distribution into three sub-periods (1991-1995, 1996-1999 and 2000-2003) . Table 6 shows that at the beginning of the transition process almost half of the investments went to the early fell by half in the last period.
[ Table 7 about here]
As for the distribution by sector (Table 7) , at the beginning of the transition, most of the investments of the EBRD went to Finance, Telecom, Oil/Gas/Natural Resources and Other sectors. The objective was to …nance infrastructure and the restructuring of the banking and the manufacturing sectors. Thereafter, the focus of the bank switched to the …nancing of the creation of small and medium entreprises (SMEs).
Econometric analysis: model and results
The EBRD selects one of the thirteen di¤erent available contracts (Table 1 ) when deciding to …nance the investment project of a …rm. The one selected should be the contract which reduces as much as possible the asymmetric information between the principal and the agent. The objective of the econometric analysis is to identify the level of heterogeneity which enables the bank to discriminate among the …rms and select the contract that will incite them to behave well. In particular, we want to verify whether the bank modi…es its behavior when it signs several contracts with the same …rm over time. If it does, as proved by Lambert (1983) , Rogerson (1985) and Chiappori et al. (1994) , this means that the bank uses the historical information (memory) about the …rm to adjust the …nancing conditions in order to maximize its pro…ts. To do so, we …rst proceed by splitting the whole population into two subpopulations: one-contract …rms and several-contract …rms. The latter subpopulation includes historical information on the …rms and we want to check if the bank uses it. This is the way both to control for the adverse selection e¤ect and identify the role of memory. We apply the same econometric speci…cation to both subpopulations but allow for di¤erent speci…cations of the same …xed e¤ects. By comparing the results and checking for robustness we are able to identify the role of memory.
Econometric model
Equations 6 and 15 describe respectively the one-period and several-period contracts. These equations are written in a reduced form as:
The amount of the money the …rm i is expected to pay back (R i ) is proportional to the return of the investment (I i ) plus a vector of other variables (D) representing the e¤ort made by the …rm in the realization of the project, its cost, and other conditions a¤ecting the success of an investment. The two former variables are linked to the …rms' behavior and the latter is associated with uncertainty in the host markets. As expressed by equation (15) when the …rm signs several contracts with the bank, the vector (D) includes the premium granted to the …rm whenever it behaves well. In our database, we do not have data for all the variables we have described. We, therefore, need to de…ne proxies for some of them. Among them is the variable R i , which is the capital plus interest that must be paid back to the bank. We have data on capital (C i ) but not on the interest rate set by the bank for con…dentiality reasons. In a simple interest contract the refund is equal to:
where C i is the capital borrowed by the …rm, m i is the maturity of the credit (in number of years) and i i is the nominal annual interest rate charged by the bank. Replacing this expression in equation (16) we obtain
As a result, the capital C i can be expressed as a function of (I i ; m i i i ; D) such that: clients. For the others we need to …nd proxies. The return of the investment (I i ) can be approximated for a solvent …rm by the value of the investment (IP , available in the database). This is the minimum level of return of any succesfull investment. As for total interest m i i i , we make three assumptions.
First, we consider that the minimum cost of borrowing in the market is the cost of a loan, and second that the bank will apply this rate to any other kind of contract it signs. Third, the maturity of a credit is di¤erent for each category of contract. Finally, we know that the interest rate charged by the EBRD is equal to Libor (London Interbank O¤ered Rate) plus a margin (r i ): Since we do not have data on the margin, we can express it as a percentage ( i ) of Libor:
If we express the margin as a percentage of Libor, the previous expression can be written as:
The variable i is time invariant because the conditions of the contract are …xed at the time of the signature.
As a result, under all these assumptions, we can approximate the value of R i .
[Box 1 about here]
The speci…cation used for the estimation derives from equation (17) and can be written as:
where i = f irm; j=country, y = sector; t = time. The description of the variables is given in Box 1.
[ Table 8 about here] Table 8 gives descriptive statistics for some of these variables for the overall period and for two years: 1993 and 2003. The dependent variable is the …nancing amount (IV ) granted by the EBRD. This is one of the variables in the bank's pro…t function, which depends negatively on the riskiness of the project. 8 It re ‡ects both the screening process and the incentive mechanism that take place across clients. The measure of political institutions is taken from Polity IV project (2007). It is an index varying between zero (for an absolute autocracy) and ten (for a fully- ‡edged democracy). 9 In our population this index declines over time because the EBRD …nanced democracies of Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the transition and later started to …nance autocratic countries from Central Asia. The variation of Libor corresponds to the historical values of the credit market over the period. 8 See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) on credit rationing. 9 See the Polity IV website for details on how the scores are computed.
According to our theoretical model and the assumptions we made, we expect that all independent variables in equation (18) 
Results
Our database contains all contracts signed by the bank over the period 1991-2003. We split it into two groups: one-contract …rms and several-contract …rms. In order to test the role of memory, we run regressions separately for each group of …rms. We proceed …rst by assessing whether the …xed e¤ect model should be preferred to the pooled OLS (with the F-test) and to the random e¤ect model (with the Hausman test). In all the regressions we control for heteroskedasticity by applying the White correction.
Then, we test the di¤erent measures of individual …xed e¤ects.
One-contract …rms
This subpopulation includes 1269 contracts. Since, each contract corresponds to a particular …rm, we do not have historical information on the …rms. Therefore we can only test one measure of individual …xed e¤ects (C13). This is a qualitative variable that identi…es each type of the thirteen contracts.
[ Table 9 about here]
[ Table 10 about here]
The results of the F-test and the Hausman test show that the …xed e¤ect model should be preferred to the pooled and random e¤ects models (Tables 9 and 10 ). In addition, the fraction of the variance due to …xed e¤ects ( ) is particularly high (0.70). The estimates of suggests that almost three-quarters of the variation in the …nancing amount is related to the di¤erent types of contracts (Baltagi, 2005 and Baum, 2006) . In the …xed e¤ect estimations, the coe¢ cients of all the explanatory variables (when they are statistically signi…cant) display the expected sign. The repayment capacity of the …rm is always highly signi…cant. All dummy variables are always statistically signi…cant. The public identity of a client turns out to be important because a public client may be considered by the bank as less risky than a private one. The signi…cance of the interaction term between democracy (DEM) and the time dummy means the more democratic a country is over time the larger is the size of the …nancing o¤ered by the bank. This result either tends to con…rm the o¢ cial claim that the EBRD promotes democratic institutions in transition countries or means that a country moving to democracy (over time) o¤ers more pro…table investment opportunities.
To sum up, for the one-contract …rms the individual …xed e¤ects by type of contract turn out to be a good measure to identify individual heterogeneity. Each contract signed by the bank is granted according to the individual characteristic of the client. This captures the optimal behavior of the bank in face of both adverse selection and moral hazard when it signs a …rst contract with a …rm that it has selected.
Several-contract …rms
This subpopulation includes 346 contracts. Now, to any …rm more than one contract applies. Therefore, we have historical information on each individual …rm and we can control for it. Given this characteristic,
we would like to check whether the individual heterogeneity we identi…ed in the previous subpopulation holds in the present one. If it does, this means that the bank deals with …rms of both subpopulations in the same way, hence neglecting historical information in the subpopulation of several-contract …rms.
Thus, we repeat the previous exercise in its entirety for this subpopulation. In order to control for heteroskedasticity we alternatively apply the White and the cluster correction. The cluster correction is important for controlling the autocorrelation in the residuals because each …rm appears more than once in the subpopulation.
[ Table 11 about here]
[ Table 12 about here]
The previous exercise for this subpopulation yields a …rst important result: individual …xed e¤ects by type of contract do not capture the individual heterogeneity as happened previously (Tables 11 and   12 ). First, the F-test is weakly signi…cant or insigni…cant while the Hausman test strongly rejects the random e¤ect model. As a result we conclude that the model with individual …xed e¤ects by type of contract is not a robust estimation technique for this subpopulation. This conclusion is reinforced by the low level of (0.07-0.12) of these estimations.
We, therefore, need to look for other measures of individual …xed e¤ects for controlling individual heterogeneity. To this end we will exploit the historical information included in this subpopulation by testing the three remaining measures of individual …xed e¤ects previously de…ned: C13F IRST; C13IP F IRST; IP F IRST: Each of these measures contains this historical information because it takes into account the information associated with the …rst contract signed by each …rm (F IRST ). The variable IP F IRST represents the project value of the …rst contract, the variable C13F IRST is the type of the …rst signed contract and C13IP F IRST is the combination among the two others. The present exercise yields the second important result of the paper: the individual …xed e¤ects by the project value of the …rst contract (and not of the following ones) accounts for individual heterogeneity in this subpopulation.
[ Table 13 about here]
[ Table 14 about here]
[ Table 15 about here]
The F-test and the Hausman test (Tables 13, 14 and 15) imply that the …xed-e¤ects model is always preferred. Whenever the project value of the …rst contract is included in the individual …xed e¤ects the value of goes up strongly. When we only consider the type of the …rst contract, however, the level of remains low. This result is evidence for the presence of memory. The project value of the …rst contract is a historical information for the bank since it re ‡ects what the …rm paid back, while the type of the …rst contract contains no history. In addition, the project value (IP ) and Libor are always statistically signi…cant and have the expected sign. We introduce an additional variable (IP DSY ) representing the case where a …rm receives more than one contract during the same year. In this subpopulation we need to control for these observations because they cannot be associated with a real memory e¤ect. It turns out that the coe¢ cient is always statistically signi…cant. This result can be interpreted as an evidence that the bank has another device for better control of the riskiness of the investments proposed by these …rms. Regarding the dummy variables, we obtain the same results as those of the subpopulation of one-contract …rms except for the public client dummy. In the present subpopulation, this dummy is never signi…cant, which reinforces our conclusion that the bank's behavior strongly relies on memory.
In the previous sample, the absence of historical information obliged the bank to rely on the other available variables, for instance, public ownership.
Memory thus allows the bank to discriminate between …rms according to their individual historical characteristics and o¤er tailored contracts to control risk better. As an indicator, it can be observed that the number of groups inside this sub-sample increases from eight to between ninety and ninety-four thank to the memory e¤ect.
Conclusions
Contract theory has proved that the optimal contract generally exhibits memory in repeated contracts with moral hazard. It has turned out to be di¢ cult to identify it clearly in the empirical literature on long-term contracting in …nancial intermediation. Considering that the method used so far in this literature is ‡awed, we proposed in this paper an alternative empirical method based on the separation of observations between short-term and long-term contracts. We argue that this procedure is required to control for the adverse selection e¤ect in the bank's lending policy. Nevertheless this is not su¢ cient.
The e¤ect of memory on moral hazard can be a¤ected by the competition e¤ect in the banking industry making it hard to isolate. The dataset we built from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development allows us to achieve it. The EBRD has been in a situation of monopoly in many transition countries especially at the outset of the transition process. Moreover, its shareholders are sovereign and assigned to the bank its mission to foster and not to crowd out …nancial ‡ows towards the private sector in these countries. Our results yield two conclusions. First, they unambiguously identify the role of memory in the bank's lending decisions when the …rms have signed more than one contract. Second, they con…rm the relevance of the empirical method we propose to control for the adverse selection e¤ect, which, in our opinion, explain the inconclusive results that is generally observed in the empirical literature. However, we think that these results will be hard to replicate with data on private banks, whose lending policies are a¤ected by competition.
6 List of table 1 2 We experience problems in running this test with this …xed e¤ect in the current and the reduced form. The variable (CT2PPRR) contains a big mass of zero values and, hence, the model …tted fails to meet the asymptotic assumption of the Hausman test.
A List of sectors
The following list indicates all the sectors to which …rms asking for a …nancing belong to:
Bank 
